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Iago.
"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."
Othello, The Moor of Venice, Act III, Scene III
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INTRODUCTION
The media of radio and television permits a single
voice to express a particular idea at a given time to a
large cross section of the population with significant
effects.

When this voice utters a defamatory imputation,

the effects of the broadcast upon the reputation of an
innocent bystander becomes a matter of litigation.

Al

though litigation should balance the interests between
free speech and the rights of the individual traduced,
this is not always the case.

Unfortunately, our legal

system is so firmly grounded in the court decisions and
laws of the past, that adaptation to the twentieth century
phenomena of radio and television has resulted in anomolous
distinctions and categories.

These distinctions and cate

gories require courts to decide whether a defamatory broad
cast is slanderous per se, slanderous per quod, libelous
per se, or libelous per quod; whether the broadcaster should
be held accountable for strict liability or due care neg
ligence; whether the defamed party should be allowed to
collect general, special, or exemplary damages; whether a
retraction statute is applicable; or whether yet additional
legal categories may apply.
A significant number of legal writers have found these
rigid distinctions and categories inappropriate for radio
1
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and television.(1)

To remedy the situation they have called

for the establishment of a new tort which would completely
overhaul the rules of defamation applicable to radio and
television.(2)

a

1962 Georgia Appellate Court in American

Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson made rec
ognizable progress toward this goal by holding that defama
tion by radio or television falls into a new category,
defamacast, and is actionable per se.(2)

Although that

decision was only a beginning of what needs to be done, it
established a precedent from which courts and legislators
may be stimulated to establish specific criteria for def
amation by broadcast.

Thus, as Henry the VII established

the law of libel with the advent of the printing press,(4)
courts and legislators today should establish the law of
defamacast to account for the unique aspects of radio and
television.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to provide a theoretical
definition of defamacast (as a new tort) to assist broad
casters in understanding present broadcast defamation laws,
and to provide useful information and suggestions for the
formulation of new defamacast laws.

The study will rec

ognize defamacast as a new tort, distinct from libel and
slander, cognizant of the effects of radio and television,
and extracted from applicable legal principles.

Broad

casters, jurists, legislators and the general public should
benefit from a clear conceptual development of this con-
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fusing and irrational area of tort law.
Review of the Literature
Several doctoral dissertations have made contribu
tions to this area of study.

Joseph Keller's doctorate

of law dissertation, "Federal Control of Defamation by
Radio," from Georgetown University in 1935 presented the
need and feasibility for a federal law of broadcast defam
ation.

Robert McMahon's "Federal Regulation of the Radio

and Television Broadcast Industry in the United States,
1957-59 with Special Reference to the Establishment and
Operation of Workable Administration Standards" from Ohio
State University in 1959 and William McDougald's "Federal
Regulation of Political Broadcasting:

A History and

Analysis" from Ohio State University in 1964 considered
the feasibility and practicality of federal regulations
and interference.

Robert Bliss analyzed the implications

of the New York Times' case which extended the actual
malice standard to reports concerning public officials in
"Some Implications for Mass Communications of New York
Times Company v. Sullivan" from the University of Iowa in
1967.

It should be noted, however, that with the exception

of Joseph Keller's 1935 study, these studies have been
primarily designed to interpret the meaning of the law
rather than to evaluate the law and suggest change.
Several master's theses have contributed research con
cerning the laws of broadcast defamation.

In 1959

Jx
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Eugene Brott at the University of Illinois summarized the
"Statutes Concerning Broadcast Defamation."

In 1960

Robert Morgan at Boston University studied "Section 315
of the Communications Act of 1934:

An Overview of the

Development of Political Broadcast Defamation."

In 1962

William Shilstone at Stanford University evaluated "Pri
vacy and Privilege:

How California Courts Have Defined

and Limited the Right of Privacy."

Of these studies,

William Shilstone's, to a greater extent than the others,
goes beyond interpretation of the law to suggest needed
revisions.

Unfortunately, the right of privacy is only

remotely related to defamation by broadcast, and
Mr. Shilstone's study is confined to suggestions for
California.

Thus, a critical evaluation of the laws of

broadcast defamation, coupled with proposed innovations,
will provide a fresh approach for research in this area.
Scope
A fictitious illustration of broadcast defamation in
a 1964 Mercer Law Review comment reveals a few of the
complexities in defamation by radio or television:
The popularity ratings of the television
program continued to decline. The sponsors
were insistent. They demanded a program
capable of attracting the public interest
and capturing the nationwide television
audience. The emcee of the program made
one last effort. He began his program by
joking about a well-known personality. Then,
warming to the subject, he began to tell
derogatory stories about this individual.
Were they true? The emcee did not know nor
did he care. But he did know that he had
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everything to gain and nothing to lose. If
the maltreated person desired to rectify the
situation, it would involve a lengthy court
room procedure and the ambiguous and unpre
dictable rules of defamation were on the
defendant's side. Let him try to prove it!(5)
Although this illustration is not all-inclusive of the
variables involved in broadcast defamation, it raises the
following questions:

Was a tort committed?

slander, libel, or defamacast?

If so, was it

Should the maltreated person

be required to prove damages or were the statements defam
atory per se?

Could gestures, vocal intonations, and

camera shots be considered defamatory?

Does a broadcaster

assume strict liability or need he only exercise due care?
These are some of the many questions which invariably are
asked when defamation occurs by radio or television.

This

study will attempt to answer such questions through a
theoretical construction of defamacast as a new tort.
Organization
The study is divided into three sections:

(1) the

origin and development of slander and libel with applica
tions to radio and television;

(2) the extraction of

applicable legal principles and explanation of the function
of those principles; and (3) the implications of the
theoretical concepts of defamacast as a new tort.
The first chapter will trace the development of slan
der and libel with the following considerations:

the

origin of slander and libel, the slander-libel distinction,
the application to radio and television, the reasons for
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concern with our present broadcast defamation laws, and the
suggestions for revamping of those laws.
The second chapter will provide a basis for the con
struction of a theoretical definition of defamacast through
explanations of the functions of applicable legal prin
ciples.

These legal principles which are inherent in the

law of broadcast defamation frequently overlap and occasion
ally conflict, making the extraction of certain workable
principles a worthwhile task.

Advantages and disadvantages

of various approaches to the lav; will be considered.
The third chapter will construct a theoretical def
inition of defamacast based upon the implicatory dimensions
extracted in the second chapter.

The new tort will be

defined in terms of a concept with related lower level
concepts, in the form of a model federal statute, and in
the form of examples in a hypothetical situation.
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Definitions(6)
Absolute Privilege— An absolute privilege protects the
publisher or disseminator of defamatory imputations
from liability without reference to his motives or
the truth or falsity of the statement.
Contacts Approach— Determines which state provides the most
contributing variables and applies that state's lav;.
Defamacast— Defamation by broadcast.
Defamation--The taking from one's reputation. The offense
of injuring a person's character, fame, or reputation
by false and malicious statements. The term includes
both libel and slander.
Exemplary Damages--An increased award in view of aggravation
of the injury by circumstances of violence, oppression,
malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the
part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the
plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feel
ings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of
the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant
for his evil behavior or to make an example of him.
General Damages— General damages are such as the law itself
implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong
complained of, for the reason that they are its im
mediate, direct, and proximate result, or such as
necessarily result from the injury, or such as did in
fact result from the wrong, directly and proximately,
and without reference to the special character, con
dition, or circumstances of the plaintiff.
Lex Loci Delecti--The law of the place where a tort is
committed.
Libel Per Quod— They are those expressions which are not
actionable upon their face, but which become so by
reason of the peculiar situation or occasion upon
which the words are written.
Libel Per Se--A publication is rendered libelous per se
when words are of such a character that a presumption
of law will arise therefrom that the plaintiff has
been degraded in his reputation and has suffered
damage.
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Negligence— The omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which
ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man
would not do.
Qualified Privilege— A qualified or conditional privilege
protects a publisher or disseminator from liability
unless actual malice or wrongful intent is shown.
Reply— A right of reply permits an alledgedly defamed
individual to use the broadcasting facilities from
which an imputation eminated concerning his reputa
tion, to reply to the imputations.
Res Ipsa Loquitor— The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
presumption that the defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
was in the defendant's exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen
in absence of negligence.
Retraction Statement— A broadcasted statement which serves
as a complete and unequivocal denial of the validity
with regard to an imputation concerning an individual
in a previous broadcast.
Single Publication Rule--Treats a defamatory broadcast as
one publication whereby the plaintiff is allowed to
plead and prove a general distribution of the imputa
tion .
Slander Per Quod--Slanderous words which require proof of
special damages.
Slander Per Se--Slanderous in itself. Words which are
slanderous without proof of special damages.
Special Damages— Those which are the actual, but not the
necessary, result of the injury complained of, and
which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate
consequence in the particular case, that is, by reason
of special circumstances or conditions.
Strict Liability— Liability without fault. Case is one of
"strict liability" when neither care nor negligence,
neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor
ignorance will save defendant.
Tort— A private or civil wrong or injury independent of con
tract. Three elements of every tort action are:
Existence of legal duty from defendant to plaintiff,
breach of duty, and damage as proximate result.

CHAPTER 1
SLANDER AND LIBEL
FROM THE SOUND WAVE TO THE ELECTRON
General Background
The law of defamation is concerned with the "taking
from one's reputation" typically through injuries to "a
person's character, fame, or reputation by false and
malicious statements. 7 )

Defamation invades an individ

ual's interests and good name in a relational manner, as
the harm involves the opinions that others may have of the
plaintiff.(8)

"Speaking generally, the law recognizes in

every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands
in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to
his discredit." (9)

The tort necessitates publication of

the defamatory matter to someone in addition to the plain
tiff.

Thus, derogatory and insulting remarks directed to

the plaintiff may form a cause of action for "intentional
infliction of mental suffering," but unless they are com
municated to someone other than the defamed there can be no
action for defamation.(10)
Defamation consists of the twin torts— slander and
libel.

In theory slander usually is oral,(H) while libel

is written;(12) however, in practice each has developed
9
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additional rules and distinctions which have become in
creasingly contradictory and anomalous. (13)

As Prosser

notes,
The explanation is in part one of historical
accident and survival, in part one of the
conflict of opposing ideas of policy in which
our traditional notions of freedom of expres
sion have collided violently with sympathy for
the victim traduced and indignation at the
maligning tongue.(14)
Many of these conflicting rules and irrational distinctions
are explainable only in light of their historical develop
ment.
Origin of Slander and Libel
As long ago as the Anglo Saxon period, remedies for
defamation existed.(I5)

Before the sixteenth century, ac

tions for defamation were tried in the local Seignorial
courts with common law courts taking no jurisdiction.(16)
After the local Seignorial courts lost their influence, the
ecclesiastical courts accepted jurisdiction and regarded
defamation as a sin punishable by penance.(17)

As these

courts in turn lost their power, tort actions for slander
reverted back to the common law courts in a slow, but steady
process.

Jurisdictional squabbles between the two tribunals

caused common lav/ courts to hold that unless "temporal"
damage could be proved, defamation was a "spiritual" matter
which should be left to the church.(18)

Eventually, the

common law courts received jurisdiction over slander; how
ever, the judges became "annoyed and dismayed"(19) by the
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unexpected flood of actions and established rigid dis
tinctions in their efforts to hedge the remedy.
Court of Star Chamber
With the introduction of the printing press, civil
actions for defamation became inadequate to suppress sedi
tious religious and political publications.(20)

As a

result Henry the VII created the Court of Star Chamber
to punish the new crime of libel.

The Star Chamber was a

criminal court of equity made up of the highest officers in
the state with jurisdiction over political and eventually
non-political libels(21) for the purpose of providing a
legal remedy to avoid duels and disturbances of the
peace.(22)

Although the Star Chamber was abolished in

1640, (23) jurisdiction passed to the common law courts with
the distinction between oral and written defamation still
intact.(24)
Thorely v. Lord Kerry
Libel was officially declared as a tort by the 1670
King v. Lake case in which the plaintiff alledged that a
petition prepared by King was "stuffed with illegal asser
tions, ineptitudes, and solecisms."(25)

The court held that

"although such general words spoken once without writing
or publishing them would not be actionable, yet here, they
being writ and published which contains more malice than if
it had been spoken, they are actionable."

In Harman v.
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Delany the court added to this reasoning by noting that
a "Word published in writing will be actionable— which
would not be so from a bare speaking of the words, be
cause libel perpetuates and dispenses the scandal."(26)
The distinctions between slander and libel were firmly
welded to the law by the case of Thorely v. Lord Kerry
in 1812, in which Sir James Mansfield recognized the
established, yet indefensible distinction in these words:
"if the matter were for the first time decided this day,
I should have no hesitation in saying that no action could
be maintained for written scandal which could not be main
tained for the words if they had been spoken."(27)

Hence,

the distinction between slander and libel was recognized
as indefensible in the 19th century; however, it had al
ready been established beyond repudiation in the law of
defamation.
Slander-libel Distinction
In today's courts, slander and libel are distinguished
primarily for the purpose of determining the amount of
evidence necessary to prove the plaintiff's claim.

Slander

per se and libel per se do not require the plaintiff to
prove special or actual damages as these damages are assumed.
Slander per quod and libel per quod, however, usually re
quire the plaintiff to prove actual damages or harm to his
reputation.
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Slander Per Se
Slander requires that actual damages be proved with
certain exceptions:

the imputation of a crime; the impu

tation of a loathsome disease; imputations affecting the
plaintiff in his trade, business, profession, or office;
and in most jurisdictions, imputation of unchastity con
cerning a woman.(28)

These categories of slander require

no proof of actual harm to the reputation of the plaintiff,
but rather such harm is presumed.
Imputation of a Crime.

An imputation of a crime may

occur through the accusation that a person is guilty of
a crime subject to corporal punishment in England,(29) with
the additional requirement that it be subject to indictment
in the United States, (30) an<g that the offense involve an
"infamous" or "disgraceful" punishment in jurisdictions
such as Hew York. (31)

Most jurisdictions now require that

the crime be one which involves "moral turpitude."(32)

As

Prosser notes, not every assault and battery involves
"moral turpitude," but the accusation that the plaintiff
beat his mother does.(33)

Thus, the courts appear to be

moving toward a standard of "major social disgrace"(34)
where even the exact crime need not be identified:(35)
words such as "thief,"(36) "pimp,"(37) and "bootlegger"(38)
have been held to be sufficient imputations of a crime.
Imputation of a Loathsome Disease.

An imputation of

a loathsome disease may cause a person to be excluded from
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society.(39)

For this reason courts recognized accusations

of venereal disease (4°) and leprosy(41) as especially
damaging to one's reputation.

On the other hand, a disease

such as smallpox was recognized as resulting in either re
covery or death, and therefore would not result in the
same social avoidance of one who had recovered from the
disease.(42)

For this reason smallpox, insanity,(43)

tuberculosis,(44) and many other communicable diseases are
not included.

Similarly, allegations that one has had

venereal disease in the past would require proof of actual
harm for damages to be awarded.(45)
Imputation Affecting the Plaintiff in His Trade.

Pro

vided that the plaintiff is engaged or about to be engaged
in a business or trade,(46) words which harm the plaintiff
in regard to his job are actionable without proof of damage.
Thus it is actionable without proof of damage to allege that
a physician is a butcher,(47) that an attorney is a shys
ter, (48) that a school teacher is guilty of improper con
duct with his pupils,(49) or that a chauffeur is habitually
drinking.(50)

jn a contrary vein, it has been held not to

be actionable without proof of damage to allege that a
physician has committed adultery,(51) that an attorney has
lost thousands of dollars,(52) or that a dancing teacher
has been drunk(53) since in these instances the plaintiff
might not be harmed in his job.
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Imputation of Unchastity Concerning a Woman.

Most

courts have held that "imputation of unchastity to a woman
is actionable without proof of damage, without regard to
whether it charges a crime."(54)

This rule has never been

applied to a man since the damage to his reputation would
not be as great;(55) however, several courts have held that
accusations of unchastity to either sex is equivalent to
a charge of fornication or adultery which involves moral
turpitude.(56)

Prosser notes that although the question

has not arisen, "it appears very likely ... that the impu
tation of homosexuality to either sex would be held to con
stitute a fifth category, actionable without proof of dam
age. "
Slander Per Quod
Slanderous words which do not fit into one of these
four categories are slanderous per quod, not slanderous in
and of themselves, and require proof of actual (special)
damages.

Special damages refer to definite, concrete, and

specific proof of injury(57) usually requiring an additional
proof of pecuniary loss.(58)

Accusations that a plaintiff

is a bastard,(59) a damned liar,(50) a Communist,(51) or
that he wets in his bed(52) will provide a cause of action
through proof of a pecuniary loss.

Once the cause of action

has been brought by the plaintiff, additional damages may
be collected for injuries to the plaintiff's reputation,(55)
wounded feelings and humiliation,(54) resulting physical
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illness and pain, (65) and even future damages of this
nature.(66)

Damages are usually limited to those which

are reasonably foreseeable as the "proximate cause" of
the accusation.(67)

Hence, unless the slanderous words

fit into one of the four slander per se categories, actual
damages must be pleaded and proved.
Libel Per Se and Per Quod
Libelous words as determined by the common law courts
were actionable without the necessity of pleading or prov
ing damages suffered by the plaintiff.

Such damage was

assumed from the publication of the libel.(68)

por this

reason the majority of jurisdictions do not require that
damages be proved where the "publication is defamatory
upon its face" (libel per se);(69) however, in cases where
extrinsic facts are needed to interpret the meaning of the
words (libel per quod), the courts have held that this
libel should be treated like slander.(70)
Expansion of Slander and Libel
From the preceding development of the distinctions
between slander and libel it can be seen that the differ
ence between the two torts involves more than oral and
written defamation, but rather encompasses the entire spec
trum of evidence requirements in a defamation suit.

At

first, these distinctions had an obvious advantage for
simplicity and ease of application; however, eventually
the common law encountered new modes of defamation,
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thereby forcing slander and libel to expand.

Thus, libel

was found in pictures,(71) signs,(72) statues;(73) and
burning(74) or hanging(75) the plaintiff in effigy,
building a gibbet in front of his house,(76) and dis
honoring his valid check.(77)

one court held that to

hang a lantern at the front door of a home of a respect
able woman was libel.(78)

Similarily, defamatory gestures

of a deaf mute were considered slander,(79) while oral
communication reduced to writing as stenographic dicta
tions (80) ancj telegrams (SI) was considered libel.
Search for a Test
This expansion of the law to include more than face
to face talking for slander and more than writing and
printing for libel invalidated the traditional oralwritten distinction.

Scholars began looking for a new

basis of distinction and for a time concluded that libel
was communicated by sight and slander by sound.(82)

with

the realization that the sight-sound test was insuf
ficient, (83) legal theorists moved toward the "permanency
of form" (84) ancj "magnitude of the potential harm" (85)
standards.
The permanency of form distinction is based on the
durability of the imputation and its capacity for easy
dissemination.

As Justice Cardozo noted in Qstrowe v.
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Lee,
Many things that are defamatory may be said
with impunity through the medium of speech.
Not so, however, when speech is caught upon
the wing and transmitted into print. What
gives the sting to the writing is its perma
nence of form. The spoken word dissolves,
but the written one abides and perpetuates
the scandal.(86)
Several legal theorists have contended that the enormous
potential harm of imputations made on radio and television
may provide an impression in the mind of an audience member
as permanent as that gained from a printed page and in no
way lessened by a lack of durability.(87)
Application to Radio and Television
While theorists were establishing the various legal
tests, the radio and television industries created prob
lems for courts(88) to adapt these distinctions to the
media.

Direct application of either the sight and sound

or the permanency criteria is futile.

Radio can reach an

audience of millions with a defamatory remark through
words conveyed by a single voice, and this voice may or
may not be embodied in a permanent form.(89)

por example,

three types of programs may include defamation:
program from a script;

(1) a

(2) a program from a script where

a performer interjects an extemporaneous defamatory remark;
and (3) a spontaneous "live" program such as an interview
whereby defamation is uttered extemporaneously.(90)

in

addition, each of these may or may not be recorded.

There

is a difference between a spontaneous defamatory remark
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on a "live” broadcast and the same remark recorded and
broadcasted later.

As could be expected, decisions have

not been consistent.(91)
Program from a Script
Defamatory remarks read from a script have in most
cases been considered as libel by the courts.

Hartman v.

Winchell(92) held such defamatory utterances to be libel
on the basis of "permanence of form," rejecting the argu
ment that the audience did not know the words were being
read from a script.

In the concurring opinion for this

case Judge Fuld attempted to open the door for a broader
base:
If the base of liability for defamation is to
be broadened in the case of radio broadcasting,
justification should be sought . . . in a frank
recognition that sound policy requires such a
result . . . That defamation by radio in the
absence of script or transcription, lacks the
measure of durability possessed by written
libel in no wise lessens its capacity for harm.
Since the element of damage is, historically,
the basis of common-law action for defamation
and since it is reasonable to preserve damage
from the nature of the medium employed, when
a slander is broadcast by radio as when pub
lished by writing, both logic and policy point
to the conclusion that defamation by radio
should be actionable per se.(93)
Although television defamation should have logically
developed this broader base by analogy to motion pic
tures, (94) such was not the case.

In Remington v. Bentley

the court rejected application of motion picture standards
and refused to categorize such defamation as libel:
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I feel that the additional factor of pic
torial representation along with the statements
adds no more to the form of defamation than
would the circumstance of a great audience in
a stadium or the like listening to the spoken
word.
I adopt this view keeping in mind and
in spite of the fact that defamation in motion
pictures has been treated as libel.(95)
The court in Landou v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.(96) took a contrary view; however, its decision was
based upon defamatory remarks from a prepared script.
Extemporaneous Remark
Defamatory remarks delivered extemporaneously provided
difficulty for the courts, not only in terms of conflicting
decisions, but in justification for their application of
the distinctions.

Many courts held extemporaneous remarks

broadcast by radio to be slander based upon a lack of
"permanence of form."(97)

in Irwin v. Ashurst, however,

the court concluded that such new media could be used as
. . . a most powerful agency for the defamation
of character . . . [A]ssume that a person writes
a speech of a defamatory nature and, after com
mitting the same to memory, speaks over the air
without referring to his manuscript. Would such
be held slander and not libel? The person v/ho
hears the defamatory material over the air ordin
arily does not knov; whether or not the speaker
is reading from a manuscript. Furthermore, what
difference does it make to such a person, so far
as the effect is concerned?(98)
The initial view of the courts regarding televised
extemporaneous remarks followed the precedent set by the
radio cases and found such defamation to be slander.(99)
This view prevailed until Shor v. Billingsley(100) rejected
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the logic of the earlier cases.

In this case the plain

tiff brought an action for defamation based upon remarks
made by Sherman Billingsley, operator of the Stork res
taurant, on his nationally televised "Stork Club Show" in
which he said of his competitor Toots Shor, operator of
the Toots Shor Restaurant:
he owes."

"I wish I had as much money as

Justice Hecht of the Supreme Court of New York

held that this defamatory broadcast should be treated as
libel rather than slander, even though it was not read
from a script.

Justice Hecht based his reasoning upon the

capacity for harm doctrine rather than "permanence of form."
Basis of Liability
The confusion is further complicated by the conflict
between those who believe that defamation by broadcast
should incur the same liabilities as the press (strict
liability)(101) and those who think it should be favored
by the law (due care negligence).(102)
Strict Liability.

Sorenson v. Wood held a radio

station liable for defamatory remarks read from a manu
script, stating simply, "The underlying basis for liabil
ity is libel, and not negligent conduct."(103)

jn a con

trasting decision the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (104) held
that the law of defamation in that state requires only
that a broadcaster exercise a high standard of care, with
no imposition of liability without fault.

These two cases

#
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exemplify the underlying question which the courts have
been unable to resolve:

Should the traditional law of

defamation (strict liability) or the law of negligence
be the basis of liability for broadcast defamation cases?
Newspaper publishers are subjected to strict liability and
many legal theorists would apply the same extent of liabil
ity to broadcasters.(105)
The analogy between newspaper publishers and broad
casters was further intertwined in Coffey v. Midland
Broadcasting Co.:
The (newspaper) prints the libel on paper
and broadcasts it to the reading world. The
owner of the radio station "prints" the libel
on a different medium just as widely or even
more widely "read."(105)
The court argued that a broadcaster should assume the same
liability for defamation outside of its control as a news
paper publisher assumes from defamation slipping by proof
readers.

A multitude of writers have supported strict

liability for broadcasters based on similar lines of
reasoning.(107)
Negligence.

Alarmed by potential imposition of strict

liability, the National Association of Radio and Television
Broadcasters (NARTB), now known as the National Association
of Broadcasters (NAB), urged state legislators to create
laws establishing lack of due care as the basis for liabil
ity. (108)

n

.A.B. distributed a model statute to encourage

adoption of statutes favorable to its professional members.
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Section 1 of the model statute provided for no liability
. . . unless it shall be alledged and proved
by the complaining party, that such owner,
licensee, operator, or such agent or employee,
has failed to exercise due care to prevent
the publication or utterance of such statement
in such broadcast.
Section 2 relieved the broadcaster from liability "for
any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of
such station or network of stations by or on behalf of any
candidate for public office."

Section 3 allowed the plain

tiff to collect "only such actual damages as he has al
ledged and proved." (109)
State legislators reacted favorably to N.A.B.'s sug
gestions with the result that at least twenty-four states
adopted statues paralleling section 1; (HO) twenty-three
followed the model in regard to section
states enacted section 3.

and four

Still other states have

somewhat modified variations of particular sections.(H3)
In addition, seven states have enacted statutes which
permit defamatory statements to be retracted. (

^

Reasons for Concern
There are several reasons for concern with the present
state of broadcast defamation laws:

(1) The laws of

broadcast defamation vary from state to state contributing
to conflict of laws.

(2) The slander-libel distinctions

as applied to radio and television result in grave ineq
uities and impractical adaptations.

(3) Arbitrary lines

drawn between actionable and non-actionable words destroy
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the balance between free speech and the rights of the in
dividual traduced.

(4) Present standards of liability

for broadcast defamation are unacceptable.

(5) Media

injuries to personality are placed in a very low level
category of consideration.

(6) The law neglects consid

eration of potentially harmful aspects of radio and tele
vised communications.

Each of the reasons for concern

cites a major inadequacy inherent in our present laws.
These inadequacies should be curbed, and where possible,
eliminated.
Conflict of Laws
The laws of defamation vary between states, but broad
casts cross state lines.
to a broadcast.

State boundaries are no barrier

A court may hold that the final act of

your broadcast occurred in a receiving set a thousand miles
away, rather than in the studio.(H5)

Because of the con

flict of laws, various legal consequences may result from
multi-state broadcast defamation.
It can be seen that no semblance of uniformity can be
found in the various approaches which the courts have de
vised in attempting to solve the choice of law problems
inherent in multi-state defamation situations.

The sub

stantive defamation laws vary greatly from state to state
and seem always to be changing. (116)
Inappropriate Distinctions
The slander-libel, distinctions as applied to radio
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and television result in grave inequities and impractical
adaptations.

A clear inequity exists in the lav/ when it

may be actionable for a defendant to write that a plain
tiff is a "damned liar" on a post card, (117) which is read
by a single person, but it may not be actionable if the same
statement is uttered extemporaneously over television to a
million viewers.

For the lesser of the two evils, publica

tion by a third person reading a post card, to receive the
brunt of the law of libel appears inequitable and unjusti
fied.

At the same time, for the obviously more serious

matter to be placed in a less serious slander category ap
pears even more disheartening, especially if that category
is slander per quod requiring the plaintiff to prove actual
damages.
In their effort to arrive at just decisions and avoid
inequities, the courts have experienced difficulty.

Many

courts have based their decisions not on the facts of the
case or the gravity of harm, but on legal precedents, state
statutes, and federal law; thereby upholding the slanderlibel distinctions, which may or may not produce a just
result in a particular case.

Not all courts, however, have

been blindly led down the "tunnels of distinction"(H8) for
several courts have considered broadcast defamation as nei
ther slander or libel,(H9) some courts have reversed
precedent for a more equitable result, (120) ancj still others
have avoided the issue through various means.(121)
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Actionable and Non-actionable Words
Arbitrary lines draiwn between actionable and nonactionable words destroy the balance between free speech
and the rights of an individual traduced.

The law holds

that certain words are defamatory while others are not,
thereby encouraging the development of distinctions and
categories.

These distinctions and categories destroy the

needed balance between free expression and the right to be
free from defamatory imputations.

As Judge I. Skelly Wright

stated in the Texas Law Review,
In drawing a line between permissible and imper
missible speech, some permissible speech will
be restricted. The speaker, lest he cross over
the line through momentary misjudgment, will
tend to keep a safe distance from the dividing
mark, and where the line is not, and cannot be,
clearly drawn, the speaker will be even more
cautious. One steers clear of a barbed wire
fence, but he stays even farther away if he is
not sure exactly where the fence is.(122)
Hence, the law might do better to delay judgment of whether
a word is defamatory or not for determination in each case.
Standards of Liability
Present standards of liability for broadcast defamation
are unacceptable.

Strict liability places an undue burden

upon the broadcasters.

The negligence standard disregards

hardships suffered by the plaintiff.

The "permanence of

form" test fails to comprehend the effects of the defama
tion, considering rather the permanence of its form, while
the "capacity for harm" test looks adversely upon broad
casting simply because of its power when in fact an in-
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dividual may not have been harmed.
Strict Liability.

Jurisdictions which follow the

strict liability theory subject their broadcasters to an
unnecessary degree of control.

Broadcasters cannot be

expected to control their dissemination of information to
the point where defamatory remarks will not occur, lest
valuable information may be lost through too close scrutiny.
In addition, as a practical matter a broadcaster is not
always in a position to know what is going to be said, nor
is it usually possible for the broadcaster to "close off
a broadcast when it appears that defamatory matter is being
published."(123)

Thus, jurisdictions which follow the strict

liability standard— drawing analogies to newspaper publications--restrict the free dissemination of information and
place broadcasters in an untenable position.
Negligence.

The due care negligence standard shifts

the basis of liability too far in the other direction, dis
regarding possible hardships suffered by the plaintiff.

As

George I. Van Os noted in the Houston Law Review;
It is entirely possible that a defamation be
broadcast without any negligence attaching to
the operators or broadcasters, and the defama
tory statement, benefit the station through
increased audience appeal or product appeal.
The plaintiff would suffer injury to his
reputation but would be unable to be remuner
ated due to the broadcaster's lack of negli
gence. (124)
Thus, in this hypothetical example, not only did the plain
tiff suffer a hardship for which he will not be appro-
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priately remunerated, but the defendant actually benefited
from the defamation.

To allow this result suggests that

justice submit itself to media power.
Permanence of Form.

As a further consideration, the

application of the "permanence of form" and the "capacity
for harm" standards fails to provide a sound basis for li
ability.

The "permanence of form" standard argues that

defamatory material read from a script should be considered
as libel.

This criterion completely disregards the effect

of the broadcast and bases liability upon material of a
permanent nature.

An audience may not know nor care that

material is being read from a script and the capacity for
harm will certainly not increase because the material was
read from a script as opposed to being expressed extempor
aneously .
Capacity for Harm.

Although the "capacity for harm"

should be considered for the purpose of formulating theories,
it should not be a theory of liability in itself.

Liability

should be based upon an actual harm in a particular case
based upon some proof of damage rather than an imputation
of harm based on the capacity of a given media to produce
such harm.
Media Injuries to Personality
Media injuries to personality are placed in a very low
level category of consideration.

As one writer noted,
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"the Washington Post, Station WCBS-TV, and Time magazine
represent clusters of power quite as awesome as the Defense
Department, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General
Motors."(125)

it cannot be denied that the function of

the courts should be to assure that victims of defamatory
imputations receive just compensation from the "media
powers."

The degree of concern for the individual traduced

should be increased from the point of view of the courts
to encourage "the maximum dissemination of information"
while " . . .

helping to protect those injured by over-

zealous communication."(126)
Relevant Distinctions.

The "real" distinctions should

establish differences between entertainment and news, injury
and non-injury, fault and lack of fault.

In regard to the

distinction between entertainment and news, Marshal S. Sharpo,
associate professor of lav/ at the University of Texas, con
tends that
When a medium creates idle curiosity simply
to satisfy it; when it advertises entities not
pressed by the exigencies of the moment merely
to get customers to buy or to view, then the
very confusion of "entertainment" with "news"
would imply that the entrepeneurial nature of
the medium must be taken into consideration in
formulating legal standards governing injury to
personality.(127)
Thus, it is readily apparent that in the case of defamation
occuring through entertainment as opposed to "hard" news,
a broadcaster should logically be required to compensate
the defamed individual.
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A further distinction might be drawn between injury
and non-injury.

For example, it is conceivable that one

individual may be severely harmed by a particular word or
statement, whereas another individual may not be affected
by that identical word or statement.

For this reason li

ability should not be based upon the "manner in which the
defamatory statement is communicated"(128) or some other
irrational distinction; but rather, the basis of liability
should be the actual harm done to the individual.

The

courts should, therefore, give more consideration to matters
such as "the plaintiff lost every friend he had" and less
to "the defendant read the imputation from a script."
In some cases a distinction between fault or lack of
fault may be needed to determine negligence (or lack of
negligence) on the part of the defendant.

Such a dis

tinction would be more acceptable than an arbitrary one
between slander and libel or their legal derivations.
Neglected Aspects of the Law
The law neglects consideration of potentially harmful
aspects of radio and televised communications:

(1) Dif

ferences in appeal by the various media are not usually con
sidered by the courts.
tions may be defamatory.

(2)

Televised non-verbal communica

(3) Technical manipulations by

radio and television stations may cause or contribute to
defamation.
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Differences in the Various Media.

In regard to the

different properties and appeals of different media,
Harvey J. Levin, author of Broadcast Regulation and Joint
Ownership of Media, noted that
These media have diverse appeals--to eye (in words
and pictures), to ear (in words and sound effects),
and to eye and ear combined. Other differences can
be defined in terms of the degree to which a medium
is space-organized (newspapers), time-organized
(radio), or time-and-space organized (movies and
television). Still other differences exist in the
degree to which any medium facilitates social
participation (movies ranking first and newspapers
last); a medium's speed (radio and television first
and movies last); and its permanence (movies ranking
first, newspapers next, and radio and television
last).(129)
These different properties and appeals, especially regarding
radio and television, have been rarely considered by the
courts.
Non-verbal Communications.

The problem is especially

acute with regard to non-verbal communication (the study
of kinesics, proxemics, and paralinguistics) which may be
as defamatory as any verbal utterance.

Scholars of kinesics,

the study of bodily movement and its resultant meaning,
believe that words express at most only thirty-five per
cent of what people wish to convey. (130)

An authority on

kinesics, Ray L. Birdwhistell, observes:

"Man is a multi-

sensorial being.

Occasionaly, he verbalizes."(131)

Prox

emics ( the study of social distance and spatial relation
ships) , paralinguistics (the study of vocal variations),
and kinesics permit the communication of meanings which may
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be defamatory in themselves or may simply contribute or
distract from a verbal imputation.

Thus, raised eyebrows,

rolling eyes, obscene gestures, cringing, unreasonable
distances between people, and vocal intonations may all be
contributing factors to a defamatory imputation over tele
vision, and in a rare instance could be defamatory without
words.

The courts should therefore provide compensation

for individuals harmed by televised, defamatory non-verbal
communications.
Technical Manipulations.

Through manipulated camera

shots, color tones, and program arrangements, broadcasters
can damage an individual's reputation either intentionally
or non-intentionally.

A simple matter such as varying

the focal length of the lens used and the subjectto-camera distance . . . (may produce) changes
in perspective.
In the 9 mm shot, the nose is
elongated and the ears seem to be far back. The
100 mm shot gives us a flatter perspective than
the 17 mm shot. In the 100 shot, the ears appear
to be much closer to the front of the face, and
the chin seems smaller.(132)
Color tones may also be manipulated to achieve various ef
fects :
That there is an emotional content associated with
color becomes obvious when we think of such terms
as "warm beige," sickening yellow," and "shocking
pink."(133)
. . . language, by itself, can only express an
experienced emotion while the visual may provide
the emotion itself.(134)
Even the arrangement of materials within programs, as well
as materials preceding and following a given program, may
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contribute to, and possibly cause defamatory imputations.
Approach to Reform of the Law
Based upon the growing concern for reform of broadcast
defamation laws, several theorists have called for the
creation of a new tort.

Speculation in this regard cul

minated in 1962 when a Georgia Appellate Court in American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson(135) held
that defamation by radio and television falls into a new
category— defamacast--and is actionable per se.

In this

case the plaintiff, one of two federal prison guards who
accompanied Alphonce Capone from Atlanta Federal Prison to
Alcatraz Federal Prison in 1934, brought an action against
the producer of a television show, "The Untouchables."

The

program showed one of the guards accepting a bribe from
Capone, an event which plaintiff contended was false.

In

holding that defamation by radio and television falls into
a new category, the court reasoned that common law must be
revamped to avoid usage of the slander-libel dichotomy.
In regard to this dichotomy, the court noted that
. . . whatever the rationale, we think the
distinction bears very little relationship
to the realities of the problem. After all,
the listener or viewer cares little and
often does not know whether a script is
being used. Nor does the use of a script
have any relationship to the broadcasters
ability to harm.(136)
It therefore appears that the court believed that the slanderlibel distinction has outlived its usefulness regarding
the realities of the problems involved in broadcast defama-
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tion.

The court further contended that the law must change

to adapt to the needs of our times.(137)
The novelty of the complaint is no objection
when an injury recognized by the law is shown
to have been inflicted on the plaintiff. In
such case, although there be no precedent, the
common law will judge according to the law of
nature and the public good.(138)
It is interesting to note that the court did not feel com
pelled to wait for legislation on the matter, as it said,
Some courts have held that the relief here sought
can be granted only by legislation, and that in
the absence of such legislation [that courts are
without power to grant it. Ursurpation of the
legislation by the courts is never justified, and
will not be tolerated. But, this fundamental
principle is not upheld by refusal of the judiciary
to discharge to the limit of its authority the
functions imposed upon it by the Constitution,
upon the excuse further legislation is necessary.
Hence, this court provided the impetus for development of a
new tort.
Although there are means of remodeling the law short of
developing a new tort, this writer will extract principles
of law which should be included in the formulation of a new
tort.

The writer will seek to indicate common variables,

dimensions and lower level concepts, needed for construction
of the new tort.

The theoretical construction of the new

tort, termed defamacast for the purpose of this thesis, will
offer information, analysis, and theory common to several
approaches for reform of law.

CHAPTER II
BROADCAST DEFAMATION
EXPLICATION OF APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
General Background
The clearest historical analogy Where a written anal
ysis influenced the construction of a new tort occured
when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis recognized a
"right of privacy" in a famous 1890 Harvard Law Review
article.(140)

This right, and the accompanying new tort,

now exist in at least thirty-four states.(141)

in the

same manner, several legal writers(142) have already
called for a new tort to cover actions for broadcast def
amation.

It seems to follow, then, that an effort should

be made to extract applicable rules and privileges from the
present law of defamation and apply them toward construction
of a new tort.

Explication of legal principles concerning

multi-state defamation, standards of liability, determin
ation of damages, and defenses against charges of defamation
will provide a basis for construction of this new tort.
Multi-state Defamation
When a defamatory utterance is made over radio and
television in one state, it will invariably reach a mul
titude of eyes and ears in other states.
35

This multi-state

36

defamation causes conflict of law problems for the courts to
settle and for victims whose right to compensation fluc
tuates "in a haphazard and arbitrary fashion according to
the particular position which each state of impact has
taken on the scope and extent of broadcaster liability."(143)
Conflict of Laws
Common law provided that every communication of a li
belous statement constituted a separate cause of action.(144)
Since it would not be feasible to allow separate causes of
action in broadcast defamation cases, for there could be
millions of actions against one defendant, the courts have
suggested three possible alternatives:

lex loci delecti

(the law of the place where a tort is committed) , (145) the
contacts approach (determining which state provided the
most contributing variables) , (146) and the single publica
tions rule (each publication gives rise to one cause of
action).(147)
Lex Loci Delecti.

In Hartman v. Time, Inc., (148) a

plaintiff alleged that he had been libelled in forty-eight
states in an issue of Time magazine.

The court held that

the single publications rule could not cross state lines and
applied a multiple publications choice of law rule in those
states which retained that doctrine.

This interpretation

placed a tremendous strain on the jury to apply the laws
of forty-nine jurisdictions (with the District of Columbia)
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to this single multi-state defamation.

Thus, although the

lex loci delecti has been a standard conflicts approach
with regard to most interstate tort situations,(1^9) it
certainly is undesirable for broadcast defamation cases
where there might be fifty-one places of simultaneous im
pact.
Contacts Approach.

In Dale System, Inc. v. General

Teleradio, (150) the court listed five "dominant contacts":
the forum, the place of last event, the point of origina
tion, the state of principal circulation, and the plain
tiff's domicile.

The court held that three of the five

contacts were found in New York and therefore applied
New York law.

In Kemart Corp. v. Printing Research Labora

tories, Inc. , (151) the court held that two "dominant con
tacts" were in California and applied California law.

In

most situations this approach is superior to lex loci
delecti for it recognizes the applicable variables and
attempts to work with them. (152)

it remains unsatisfactory,

however, in that it does not engender uniformity or pre
dictability, nor can it consider the vast array of variables
applicable to radio and television.(153)
Single Publication Rule.

In cases involving venue or

or the statute of limitations, the majority of American
courts have adopted the "single publication rule" which
treats a defamatory broadcast as one publication whereby the
plaintiff is permitted to plead and prove a general dis-
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tribution of the libel as evidence of damage. (154)

The

Commissioners of Uniform State Laws have adopted this rule
in the Uniform Single Publications Act which six states
have enacted. (155)

Section 1 of this act provides that

Wo person shall have more than one cause of
action for damages for libel or slander . . .
of a broadcast over radio or television. Re
covery in any such action shall include all
damages for any such tort suffered by the
plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
Section 2 provides that
A judgement in any jurisdiction for or against
the plaintiff upon the substantive merits of
any action for damages founded upon a single
publication or exhibition or utterance des
cribed in Section 1 shall bar any other action
for damages by the same plaintiff against the
same defendant founded upon the same publica
tion or exhibition or utterance.
If the "single publication rule" were followed in all states,
the choice and conflict of law problems would be greatly
diminished.
Federal Law
Our national scheme of radio and television publication
requires a federal law of broadcast defamation.

A federal

law would have three potential advantages over our present
conglomeration of state laws.

First, the law could produce

uniformity among the states providing "some degree of cer
tainty to both the publisher and his libel victim."(156)
Second, a national law could "establish ground rules" and
provide a "simplified procedural framework for their enforce
ment." (1^)

Third, a federal law could abolish the confused
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mass of inappropriate distinctions in the present law.(158)
This approach would be justified by three separate
constitutional provisions,(159) by the national character
of broadcast defamation, and by the practical adaptations
of such a law.

In this manner Congress could create a

federal cause of action leaving the actual responsibility
of molding a federal common law to the courts; or even
better, Congress could develop rules and privileges to be
applied by the courts.
Basis of Liability
Whether a broadcaster should be considered as a pub
lisher or a disseminator, has not been resolved by the
courts.

For this reason the courts are still troubled by

two theories of liability:

strict liability in the case

of a publisher and due care negligence in the case of a
disseminator.
Broadcaster as Publisher
It has been established that in order for defamation
to occur, there must be "publication,"(160) which means
that the defamatory imputation must be communicated to
someone other than the defamed.

Publication may be oral,

written, or even conveyed by gestures or the exhibition of
a picture or statue. (161)

Every repetition of the defama

tion is a publication in itself; (162) and usually, every
one who takes part in the defamation is charged with pub
lication. (163)

There may even be an affirmative duty to

remove a publication made by another. (164)

The publisher

of defamation, whether libel(165) or slander, (166) ps
strictly liable regardless of whether he originated it.
The majority of jurisdictions lean toward holding broad
casters accountable as publishers.(167)
Broadcaster as Disseminator
A "disseminator," on the other hand, merely circulates
defamatory materials already communicated to another. (168)
The proprietor of a bookstore or newspaper stand distributes
or disseminates books and periodicals.

In a close analogy

to the bookstore, the broadcaster distributes and dissem
inates information, which is often out of his immediate con
trol and may not be detected.

As Professor Francis Bohlen

stated in the Harvard Law Review, it
would seem that justice would be done and the
good reputation of all mankind given sufficient
protection by treating the broadcaster as a
disseminator rather than publisher of the def
amatory interpolation.(169)
Professor Bohlen suggested that the broadcaster should be
liable only if he fails to exercise care to insure "that no
scandalmonger should take advantage of its facilities to
speak over its microphone matter defamatory of other per
sons. "(170)

The American Lav/ Institute's Restatement of

Torts adds that a broadcaster is "at least liable" for dis
semination of defamation where he fails to exercise due care
to prevent publication.(171)
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American Law Institute's Restatement
In their quest to restate the law of defamation ap
plicable to radio and television, the American Law Institute
recognized three approaches:

(1) to prescribe liability

equal to that of a newspaper and periodical publisher or
strict liability;

(2) to establish a duty of care for

broadcasters, breach of which would establish liability;
and (3) to treat the matter as caveat without a positive
pronouncement on it.

The Institute voted seventeen to

fourteen to treat the matter as caveat with the following
comment appearing in their Restatement:
A libel may be published by broadcasting over
the air by means of the radio, if the speaker
reads from a prepared manuscript or speaks from
written or printed notes or memoranda. Whether
an extemporaneous broadcast is a libel or a
slander depends on factors stated in subsection (3).(172)
Subsection 3 calls for consideration of the geographic area
in which dissemination occurs, the deliberation and pre
meditation of the publication, and the persistence of the
defamatory conduct.(173)
Strict Liability
Strict liability evolved from the English courts where
the defendant was held liable without regard to whether he
was negligent, (174) whether he intended to harm the plain
tiff (175) or whether he might in fact have intended to
praise the plaintiff. (176)

The only limitation placed upon

liability required the defamatory meaning to be "reasonably
conveyed to and understood by others"(177) as referring to
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the plaintiff and harming the plaintiff.
Those favoring application of strict liability to
broadcasters argue that the active participation of the
broadcaster is necessary for publication of defamation;
that the law of defamation imposes the risk of publication
upon the publisher rather than the victim; and that owners
of radio and television stations enter such a business with
the awareness of certain risks. (178)

strict liability

would impose joint liability upon the broadcaster and the
speaker in their capacity as publishers and would "abolish
any distinction between defamation from a script and defama
tion by an extemporaneous remark."(179)

These theorists

contend that a station would protect itself by taking
proper corrective measures.(180)

What some theorists fear,

however, is that "victims" of harmless remarks would create
a "flood of litigation" thereby congesting the courts with
trivial matters; and that information, analysis, political
viewpoints, and entertainment would be curtailed by broad
casters to avoid liability. (181)
Negligence
Proponents of the negligence basis note that negligence
would provide the courts with a familiar standard of re
quired conduct for the defendant; that the plaintiff would
be required to prove actual damages; and that the burden of
proof would be on the plaintiff and the defendant could pre
sent whatever defenses might exist.(182)

These theorists
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further reason that since a broadcast is subject to very
little control, the laws of negligence would provide the
only equitable result.

The principle objection to this

approach arises where the plaintiff suffers an unwarranted
hardship and the broadcaster was not in any way negligent,
yet the station accrues a benefit through increased aud
ience or product appeal.(183)
Search to Balance Interests
Neither the strict liability approach nor the neg
ligence standard balance the interests between the rights
of defamed individuals as contrasted with the rights of
society to be informed and the rights of broadcasters to
exercise free speech.

Absolute liability places an un

warranted burden upon the defendant (broadcaster) and could
even stifle the flow of information in a free society.

The

negligence requirement tips the balance in the other di
rection by requiring the plaintiff to fulfill the almost
impossible task of proving negligence.(184)

Hence, the

courts need a new basis of liability to balance these in
terests and provide a workable method of deciding broadcast
defamation cases.
Res Ipsa Loquitor
A 1964 Houston Law Review article suggests application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to balance the in
terests. (185)

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor would re

quire the plaintiff to prove three conditions which must be
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present in a defamatory broadcast for the broadcaster to be
held liable.

These conditions, as they have been estab

lished in the law of negligence, require that:

"(1) the

damage must be of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence;

(2) it must be caused by an in

strumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant;
and (3) it must not be due to any voluntary act on the
part of the p l a i n t i f f (186)

The article explains that this

doctrine would provide for an equal balance of interests:
The plaintiff, to establish the inference of
negligence, must prove that the three con
ditions are present. The defendant would have
the opportunity to rebut the inference of neg
ligence. The plaintiff would have difficulty
proving the actual operations of a radio or
television station, whereas this would not
present a problem to the defendant. Each party
would be required to prove up certain elements,
but neither party would be hindered by an unjust
burden of proof.(187)
Thus, the res ipsa loquitor doctrine would provide an eq
uitable and workable basis of liability from which both the
plaintiff and defendant could present arguments germane to
a particular case.

With this basis of liability, the de

fendant would have to prove a lack of negligence and the
plaintiff would have to counter with proof that the defendant
has received a benefit.

The jury would be free to make

equitable compensations in particular cases.
Determination of Damages
When a defendant is found liable, damages flow as a
natural result.

These damages are a "pecuniary compensation
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or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any
person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether
to his person, property, or rights, through an unlawful act
or omission or negligence of a n o t h e r (188)

Types of dam

ages, statutes regulating damages, mitigation of damages,
and theories of compensation should be considered with their
application to broadcast defamation.
Types of Damages
Black1s Law Dictionary defines thirty-four different
types of damages. (189)

The three most common divisions of

damage applicable to broadcast defamation are general,
special, and exemplary damages.

General damages are awarded

for "loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt
feelings," (190) and are implied or presumed "to have ac
crued from the wrong complained of . . . without reference
to the special character, condition, or circumstances of
the plaintiff. (191)

Special damages are those which the

plaintiff alleges and proves for his actual and real loss
or injury. (192)

Exemplary damages are awarded to the plain

tiff as a means of punishing the defendant for actual
malice.(193)
General Damages.

General damages are awarded to the

plaintiff with the presumption that a defamatory imputation
would cause a harm to the plaintiff's reputation, implied
in the law without actual proof of harm in a particular
case.

Imputations which are held slanderous per se or
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libelous per se presume that damage has resulted.
Special Damages.

Special damages require proof of

actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation.

In order to

collect special damages, the plaintiff must allege and
prove that a certain defamatory imputation caused a harm
to his reputation.

Imputations which are held to be slan

derous per quod, and in some cases libelous per quod, re
quire proof of actual damage.
Exemplary Damages.

Exemplary damages are awarded upon

proof of actual malice on the part of a defendant.(194)
This malice will not be presumed from the broadcast, but
must be proved by the plaintiff.

Exemplary damages punish

the defendant for his malicious behavior thereby making an
example of him.

Exemplary damages are sometimes referred

to as punitive or vindictive damages.
Statutes Regulating Damages
There is no set rule for awarding damages as each
jurisdiction has its own peculiar adaptations.

The National

Association of Broadcaster's model statute advocates the
use of only special damages requiring the plaintiff to al
lege and prove damages in each case.

The majority of juris

dictions, however, allow general or exemplary damages or both
to be recovered in certain instances.

In addition, some

states punish broadcast defamation criminally, and others
have enacted retraction statutes which may be used to
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mitigate damages.
N .A .B . Model Statute
Section 3 of the National Association of Broadcaster's
model statute provides that "the complaining party shall
be allowed only such actual damages as he has alleged and
proved."(195)

Arizona, (196) Nebraska, (197) and Wyoming(198)

have adopted the provision verbatim, while Georgia's
statute(i99) provides that the complaining party shall be
allowed only "actual consequences, or punitive" damages
which have been alleged and proved.

Louisiana, (200)

Oregon, (201) and Mary l a n d (202) provide recovery of damages

for actual injury suffered, although their statutes are
worded somewhat differently.
The Majority Rule.

Legislation requiring proof of

damage in libel has been enacted in at least sixteen
states; (203) however, the majority of jurisdictions appear
to follow the common law rule that certain imputations are
actionable per se without proof of damage.

In situations

where the imputation was not actionable per se, these
courts hold that damages must be alleged and proved.
Criminal Punishment.

Thirty-three states have some

form of criminal punishment for broadcast defamation.(204)
This punishment varies from California's statute(205) pro
viding for "a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or

48
by both such fine and imprisonment" to a more lenient North
Dakota statute which calls for "a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars."(206)

Thus, in the majority of

states a broadcaster may be subjected to both criminal
and civil liability.
Retraction Statutes.

Ten states have retraction

statutes whereby a defendant may retract statements made
in a defamatory broadcast. (207)

These statutes usually

provide that only actual damage may be recovered if a re
traction is published and there is no malice on the part
of the defendant.
Mitigation of Damages
Damages may be reduced or mitigated by "facts which
show that the plaintiff's conceded cause of action does
not entitle him to so large an amount as the showing on
his side would otherwise justify the jury in allowing
him."(208)

might therefore be argued that damages

should be mitigated through retraction statements, through
the plaintiff's exercise of his right of reply, and by
proof that certain statements were true.
Retraction Statements.

Under common law, a retraction

made immediately after the defamation served to exonerate
the defendant, provided that the defamatory imputations did
not have time to make an impression and be spread further.
Retractions have three additional functions: (209) to show
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that the plaintiff has suffered less than he claims with
regard to actual damages, (210) to reduce or negate the
"malice" or outrageous conduct which form the basis for
exemplary damages, (211) and to provide evidence of the
defendant's good motives and intentions in exercising a
privilege. ^-^-2)

A refusal to retract when a request has

been made may be evidence of malevolence or improper pur
pose on the part of a defendant. (213)

^ retraction must

be full and unequivocal^^^ with reference to the original
publication (215) and must be more than a mere offer to pub
lish any statement which the plaintiff cares to make.(216)
Right of Reply.

In 1822 France enacted press legis

lation which provided a right of reply under which a plain
tiff may publish his own version of a matter with the use
of a defendant's (newspaper) facilities. (217)

This French

right influenced the enactment of similar legislation in
most European and South American countries. (218)

The

French law permits a reply to expressions of opinion as
well as fact and allows the person replying to express his
own point of view.

This right is also provided in

Nevada's (219) general reply statute and the right has been
granted to political candidates in Mississippi. (220)

in

addition, Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of
1934 provides a limited right of reply over radio and tele
vision.

Section 315 requires a station which permits one

legally qualified candidate to use its facilities to afford
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equal opportunities to all other candidates for that office.
Richard C. Donnelly contends in a 1948 Virginia Law
Review article that it should be possible
for a person who feels aggrieved by a state
ment . . . to avenge his reputation without
having to resort to the sordid procedure of
a law suit to recover damages; to provide
him with a form of relief more appropriate
to the type of harm sustained. Second, is
to make newspapers and other media of mass
communications serve as better instrumental
ities for the dissemination of conflicting
and divergent points of view . . . freedom
is more than freedom from; it should be
freedom for . . .(221)
In cases where a broadcaster did not believe the statement
to be defamatory, Donnelly suggests that a defendant (broad
caster) should be given a choice to retract an allegedly
defamatory statement or offer the defamed individual a
chance to reply to the statement.

With this innovation

in the law, either a defendant's retraction or a plaintiff's
reply could be used to mitigate damages and in some cases
completely exonerate a broadcaster from liability.
Truth.

In the present law, truth is a complete de

fense from liability.

This defense exists despite the fact

that a defendant may have published remarks for morally
indefensible and malevolent reasons.(222)

Certainly, a

defendant should be required to have a purpose in harming
someone's reputation, regardless of the truthfulness of his
imputations.

For this reason, there is significant support

for "dropping" truth as a complete defense and reserving
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its use for the mitigation of damages.(223)
Theories of Compensation
There appear to be three theories of compensation:
monetary reimbursement, monetary benefit, and restoration
of the plaintiff's reputation.

The theories differ in their

requirements for the proof of damage, their concern for the
reputation of a plaintiff, and their effect upon the free
flow of information in a free society.
Monetary Reimbursement Theory.

The theory of monetary

reimbursement would require the plaintiff to prove special
damages, as in slander per quod and libel per quod cases.
Although there may be times when a plaintiff is harmed
without a clear ability to prove damages, the theory rests
upon the belief that a defendant should compensate a plain
tiff for only actual damages.

Hence, this theory is

weighted heavily in favor of the defendant and provides
little opportunity for the plaintiff to restore his reputa
tion.
Monetary Benefit Theory.

The monetary benefit theory

would not require the plaintiff to prove damages, but
rather would award them on the basis of the defamatory
nature of certain imputations or proof of actual malice.
General damages would be awarded in slander per se and libel
per se cases.

Exemplary damages would be awarded for proof

of actual malice on the part of the defendant.

This theory
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of awarding damages without proof of harm raises two prob
lems:

(1) the free flow of information in a free society

may be stifled and restrained; and (2) certain imputations
are not indefinitely actionable.

An English writer ex

presses concern for the first problem, in stating
There is danger in this hypersensitiveness, for
not only does it produce quite unmerited wind
falls for the lucky litigants, but also it may
tend to check and restrain the press in the
exercise of its duty of making legitimate cri
ticism and comment.(224)
Judge Fuld in Mencher v. Chesley discussed the second area
of concern:
Whether language has that tendency (being action
able without proof of special damage) depends,
among other factors, upon the temper of the times,
the current of contemporary public opinion, with
the result that words, harmless in one age, in
one community, may be highly damaging to reputa
tion at another time or in a different place.(225)
Restoration of the Plaintiff 1s Reputation.

Restoration

of the plaintiff's reputation could be partially accomplished
through a statement of reply or retraction.

In cases where

this reply or retraction would be inadequate for the harm
suffered by the plaintiff, a law suit in which actual
damages would be proved and public awareness would be
evoked could further repair the plaintiff's reputation.
Thus, the emphasis would be upon restoration of the plain
tiff's reputation, rather than strict reimbursement or bene
fit.

Although this theory is not presently applied to the

law of broadcast defamation,(226)

appears to provide
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maximum freedom of speech with sufficient protection of an
individual's interest in his reputation.
Defenses Against Charges of Defamation
A defendant may be exonerated from liability by estab
lishing the defense of an absolute privilege, a qualified
privilege, or truth.

An absolute privilege protects a

speaker or publisher, without reference to his motives or
the truth or falsity of a statement, for statements made
in judicial proceedings, in legislative proceedings, in
executive communications, with the consent of the plain
tiff, between husband and wife, and in political broad
casts under section 315. (227)

A qualified privilege pro

tects the defendant, unless actual malice and knowledge of
the falsity of the statement is shown, for communication in
the interest of the publisher, in the interest of a close
associate, in the interest of a business function, with one
who may act in the public interest, in the interest of
public concern and fair comment, or in the public's interest
to be informed through reports of public proceedings.(228)
In addition, most jurisdictions have held that truth is a
complete defense regardless of the defendant's motives.
Absolute Privilege
An absolute privilege completely protects a defendant
from liability, regardless of his motives in publishing a
statement or the truth or falsity of a statement.

The
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clearest instance where broadcasters are provided an ab
solute privilege occurs when political candidates speak
under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act.

Al

though the privilege covers a small part of a broadcast
day, the protection of the privilege in cases where it is
applied is significant.
Judicial Proceedings.

An absolute privilege extends

to anything that may be said in relation to a matter at
issue regarding any hearing before a tribunal which per
forms a judicial function.

The immunity does not cover

publications made before commencement or after termination
of the official proceedings.

It is also clear that state

ments given to the media concerning judicial proceedings
are not absolutely privileged.(229)
Legislative Proceedings.

Whatever is said in the

course of legislative proceedings is absolutely privileged
with regard to what the legislators might say.

When these

statements are republished outside of the legislature, the
absolute privilege is lost. (230)

in the case where legis

lative proceedings are recorded by radio and television,
the broadcaster receives a qualified rather than an ab
solute privilege.(231)
Executive Communications.

In the discharge of their

duties, executive officers of the government, primarily on
the national level, are privileged to communicate with ab
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solute immunity.

This privilege is extended to press re

leases whereby officials may explain their actions to the
public, including "all publications within the 'outer
perimeter' of their 'line of duty.'"(232)
Consent of the Plaintiff.

When the plaintiff consents

to a publication, he cannot complain about later damages
to his reputation. (233)

This consent must be more than a

request to speak, (234) an inquiry to what is meant, or
consent to a different form or content of publication.(23j )
Political Broadcasts.

Section 315 of the Federal

Communications Act provides that broadcasters shall afford
equal opportunities to all political candidates, and that
the station shall have no power of censorship.

This has

been interpreted to mean that a broadcaster may not refuse
any legally qualified candidate if one is allowed to speak,
nor may he exert any control over what is said. (236)

since

publication in this regard is required by law, the broad
caster receives absolute immunity.
Qualified Privilege
A qualified privilege results when a publication is
"firmly made by a person in the discharge of some public
or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct
of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is con
cerned. " (237)

The immunity from liability is conditioned

upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper
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purpose.(238)
Fair Comment on Matters of Public Concern.

Although

the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not confer
a privilege to publish defamatory materials merely because
it has "news" value and the public would like to hear
it, (239) the privilege does extend to matters which are
of legitimate concern to the community.(240)

This pri

vilege relates to the discussion of the administration of
public affairs,(241) the conduct or qualifications of public
officers or candidates,(242) or employees,(243) the spending
of public funds, (244) the management of institutions,(245)
the affairs of private enterprise which affect the general
interest of the community, (246) ancj anything submitted to
the public for approval such as a book, sports event, or
scientific discovery.(247)
For this reason broadcasters may provide comment upon
matters of public concern with assurance that the con
stitutional guarantee of freedom of speech includes the
qualified privilege of making controversial statements
about individuals.

The Supreme Court in New York Times

Company v. Sullivan(248) extended this privilege to false
statements of fact about individuals connected with all
matters of public concern.(249)

jn these instances, as in

all matters providing a qualified privilege, the communica
tion is privileged unless actual malice or improper intent
can be associated with the publisher.
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Reports of Public Proceedings.

It has been reasoned

that a reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye
and that public affairs should be made known to all.(250)
By this reasoning, the reporting of legislative proceed
ings,^^-) investigation of committees, (252) deliberations
of municipal c o u n c i l s , a n d official governmental
reports and communications(254) may be conducted under the
claim of privilege.

This privilege does not extend to

reports of a private group,(255) unless the meeting is
open to the public, and what is said bears upon the public
interest.(256)

has been held that reports of this

nature, having a qualified privilege, must be substantially
accurate and must state the source of what is being re
ported. (257)
Truth as a Defense
The old English rule held that "the greater the truth
the greater the libel."

Most American jurisdictions have

now reversed this rule and hold that truth is a complete
defense.(258)

Ten states have statutory provisions re

quiring that the publication must be made with good motives
and for justifiable ends.(259)

In the majority of juris

dictions, however, it is "immaterial that the defendant
published the facts for no good reason or for the worst
possible motives, or even that he did not believe at the
time that they were true."(260)

This rule has been attacked

on the grounds that "it affords immunity for morally inde-
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fensible malevolence and needlessly kicking a man when he
is down."(261)

^ more reasonable approach would consider

truth as a qualified privilege.

CHAPTER III
DEFAMACAST AS A NEW TORT
IMPLICATION OF THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS
General Background
Although there has been disagreement as to the direc
tion in which the law of broadcast defamation should move,
the writer will theoretically revamp the entire law.

De-

famacast, defamation by broadcast, will be considered as
a new tort v/ith related lower level concepts.

Concept

ualization of this new tort will be accomplished through
a suggested model statute at the federal level.

This

model statute will establish a federal cause of action;
a sound basis of liability; general, special, and exem
plary damages; provisions for retraction and reply state
ments; and modifications of our present absolute and qual
ified privileges.
vantageous:

The proposed federal law will be ad

first, by eliminating most conflict of law

problems; second, by removing the inappropriate distinctions
from the law; third, by balancing the interests of the
plaintiff and defendant; fourth, by curbing mass media
injuries to personality; fifth, by allowing maximum free
speech with sufficient protection for the individual; and
sixth, by protecting the public from unfair manipulations
59
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of media equipment.

The dimensions of the new tort will

be further explained through a hypothetical projection of
possible litigation.
A Federal Model Statute
Construction of a model statute at the federal level
would significantly change our present concepts of defama
tion by broadcast.

Although the term defamacast is not

specified in the model statute, the term could be used by
the courts to refer to the distinct tort of defamation by
radio and television.

The proposed law follows.

Defamation by Radio and Television
Section 1 This act hereby establishes a federal law of
broadcast defamation.
Section 2 Any victim of defamation emitted from the media
of radio and television shall have a cause of action
against any broadcaster engaged in disseminating such
defamatory communications as well as any originator or
publisher of the communication. The defamed party, whether
an individual or a group of individuals, shall be required
to prove that such imputations were of a defamatory nature
as established in the laws of precedent or as indicated
by the facts of a particular case; whereupon, a jury trial
shall determine whether or not a disseminator or publisher
is liable based upon the malice standard, negligence theory,
or the res ipsa loquitor doctrine.
Section 3 Any dissemination or publication of defamatory
materials, whether true or untrue, whether privileged or
not privileged, whether creating an anticipated or an
unanticipated effect, which is broadcast with a malicious
or wrongful intent shall subject all persons or groups of
persons with that intent to liability.
Section 4 A disseminator or publisher shall be liable for
any act of negligence where a defendant breached a duty
under the circumstance to exercise due care to prevent a
defamatory broadcast.
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Section 5 Any disseminator or publisher of defamation
shall be liable when a presumption of negligence is estab
lished through application of the res ipsa loquitor doc
trine, whereby (1) the damage in a particular case was of
a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence, (2) the harm was caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the
imputation was not due to any voluntary act on the part of
the plaintiff.
Section 6 As compensation for loss to a plaintiff's repu
tation, a jury shall award either general damages which
are implied in the law without proof of actual harm;
special damages which require proof of actual harm to the
plaintiff's reputation; exemplary damages which are awarded
upon proof of actual malice or wrongful intent; or any
combination of these damages. A plaintiff shall recover
whatever damages are awarded from all defendants in a single
trial and shall have no further cause of action for the
original matter of litigation with the only remaining right
being that of appeal to a higher court.
Section 7 A broadcaster shall make a reasonable effort to
retract imputations which are untrue or accidentally broad
cast or clearly defamatory where a complete and unequivocal
retraction is agreed to by the defamed party or is designed
to repair the injured party's reputation. A retraction
broadcasted in this manner shall be considered in determin
ation of liability and assessment of damages.
Section 8 Any individual or group defamed over radio or
television shall have a right of reply to defamatory al
legations whereby the public may be informed of the truth.
This right may be denied by a broadcaster where he does
not feel a reply is necessary or appropriate, whereupon the
allegedly defamed individual may present his case to a
local magistrate in an effort to receive a court order to
enforce the right of reply. The local magistrate shall
grant or deny the right of reply based upon the circum
stances of the case. A reply broadcasted in this manner
shall be considered in determination of liability and
assessment of damages.
Section 9 There is no absolute privilege to broadcast de
famatory imputations with the exception of a public official
explaining his actions to the public, a plaintiff consenting
to a publication, a political candidate speaking under
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, or any other
exceptions granted by Congress.
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Section 10 A qualified privilege shall be extended to
broadcasters to report the affairs of public proceedings,
to make fair comment regarding matters of public concern,
to broadcast truthful defamatory imputations, and to
manipulate media equipment in all aspects of broadcasting.
In these and other instances as established by Congress
and the courts, a broadcaster shall not be liable without
proof of actual malice or wrongful intent.
Implications of the Proposed Innovations
In order that each of the sections of the model statute
shall be interpreted as intended, the sections will be
explained in greater detail.

The implicatory meanings of

the specific words of the various sections shall be con
sidered for the purpose of explanation and analysis.
Implications of Section _1
A federal law of broadcast defamation would supersede
all state laws which conflict with any of the provisions
set forth in the statute.

Similarly, all courts at the

federal, state, and local levels would be required to hold
in accordance with the federal law regardless of previous
holdings under common law.

In cases where a matter is at

issue which is not provided for under this statute, the
courts would be free to apply whatever statutory or common
law principles appear applicable in a particular case.
Implications of Section

2_

A person defamed by a radio or television broadcast
would have a cause of action against the publisher, person
initiating the defamation, and the disseminator, broad
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caster, upon establishing to a local magistrate that cer
tain imputations were of a defamatory nature.

Imputations

of a defamatory nature would include words which have been
established as defamatory in the laws of precedent, verbal
and non-verbal communications which a reasonable person
might interpret as being defamatory, and manipulation of
media equipment which a reasonable person might interpret
as harming the plaintiff's reputation.

A local magistrate

would determine whether the individual had a significant
cause of action to be sent to the jury.

If the plaintiff

had a cause of action, and the defendant did not have a
privilege or a clear defense, the case would be sent to the
jury for the determination regarding liability and the
possible assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 3^
The state of mind of a broadcaster or disseminator, at
the time of a broadcast or before a broadcast, may form the
basis of liability.

Although actual malice or wrongful

purpose may be difficult to prove, it offers the plaintiff
an opportunity to recover damages without proof or implica
tion that the defendant was negligent.

Instead, liability

is based upon a wrongful intent or purpose which accom
panied a defamatory broadcast, but may not have in itself
caused the imputation.
Implications of Section 4_
A defendant would be liable for the breach of a duty
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which was the proximate cause of a defamacast.

This duty

would amount to an exercise of due care to prevent defama
tory broadcasts.

In all cases where the defendant is

charged with negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant owed a duty to exercise due care under the cir
cumstances in a particular case.
Implications of Section _5
In cases where a plaintiff is unable to prove neg
ligence, that plaintiff may allege that negligence should
be presumed under the res ipsa loqui-fcor doctrine.

This

doctrine provides a presumption of negligence for defama
tion which would not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence.

A defendant could defeat the presumption

through proof that active, overt action by the plaintiff
or a third person caused the defamatory broadcast; that
the defendant lacked control or a right to control the
facilities; that the negligence of a third party caused the
defamation to occur; or that an act of God caused the def
amation to occur.

Similarly, a defendant could either

defeat recovery or reduce damages through proof of con
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

If the

actions of a plaintiff which cause defamation to occur are
interpreted as a voluntary act, beyond negligence, the
plaintiff cannot recover damages.
Implications of Section 6
Damages are awarded as compensation for a wrong done
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to a plaintiff.

General damages are awarded with the

assumption that the plaintiff has suffered a harm to his
reputation.

The extent of that harm need not be proven

in every case.

If the plaintiff alleges and proves actual

harm or loss, special damages, the jury may award damages
to the extent warranted by the proof.

In cases where the

defendant harbored a malicious or wrongful intent while
publishing or disseminating defamation, the plaintiff may
be awarded exemplary damages upon proof of such intent on
the part of the defendant, without the necessity of proving
actual harm or loss to his reputation.

It therefore

becomes imperative that the courts use their best judg
ment in awarding damages.
This section limits a plaintiff to one cause of action
for damages against all of the defendants in a single
trial.

Once the trial is in progress, a plaintiff will

have no further causes of action for that defamatory broad
cast.

Hence, the single publications rule will be applied

with the additional requirement that the causes of action
be brought against all defendants in a single trial.

The

only right of either the plaintiff or the defendant beyond
the actual trial would be a right of review or appeal to a
higher court.
Implications of Section

1_

When defamacast occurs, the broadcaster has a duty to
make a reasonable effort to retract the imputation, if
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possible, especially in cases where defamacast occurs by
accident, appears to be untrue, or is clearly of a defama
tory nature.

The broadcaster must, however, use caution

not to issue a retraction which would only add to the
defamation.

To guard against the possibility of making

an improper retraction the broadcaster should, whenever
possible, receive the written consent of the allegedly
defamed party.

In any event, the broadcasted retraction

should be complete and unequivocal, and designed to repair
the injured party's reputation.

A proper or an improper

retraction, including any aspect of a refusal or offer to
retract, should be considered by a jury in determination
of liability and assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 8^
As a minimal requirement of free speech, a right of
reply allows an allegedly defamed individual to reply to
certain previous imputations.

This reply can be made over

the same media which broadcasted the imputations.

If the

right of reply is denied by a broadcaster on the basis of
it being unnecessary or inappropriate, the allegedly de
famed individual will have one remaining chance to enforce
the right of reply.

He may present his case to a local

magistrate with the hope that the local magistrate will
issue a court order to enforce the right of reply.

The

circumstances surrounding the granting or denial of this
right, as well as the content and effect of. a broadcasted
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reply, may be used as evidence in court for determination
of liability and assessment of damages.
Implications of Section 9_
An absolute privilege, which completely relieves a
defendant from liability, will not be granted with four
exceptions:

(1) When a public official explains his actions

to the public, the official and the disseminator of his
information are relieved of liability with regard to what
the official communicates to the public.

(2) When a

plaintiff consents to a defamatory publication, the de
fendant is not liable.

(3) When a political candidate

speaks under Section 315 of the Federal Communications
Act, the broadcaster has an absolute privilege to dis
seminate the candidate's speech without liability; however,
the candidate may be liable for his own statements.

(4) Any

other exceptions specifically provided for by Congress shall
be included.
Implications of Section 10
A qualified privilege, which relieves a defendant of
liability where there is no proof of actual malice or
wrongful intent, shields broadcasters with a privilege
(1) to report matters of public concern which are of legit
imate concern to the community including publication of
false statements of fact about individuals connected with
all matters of public concern;

(2) to report the affairs

of public proceedings including legislative proceedings,
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investigation of committees, deliberations of municipal
councils, and official governmental reports and communica
tions;

(3) to broadcast truthful defamatory imputations;

and (4) to manipulate media equipment in all aspects of
broadcasting.
Advantages of the Proposed Changes
In order to freely accept change, one must recognize
potential advantages to be accrued from that change.

The

writer's proposed model statute offers improvements over
the status quo which will benefit plaintiffs, defendants,
broadcasters, individuals who have been defamed, and the
general public.
Elimination of Most Conflict of Lav; Problems
A federal law of defamacast with a federal cause of
action, with a single publications rule, and with the re
quirement that all defendants be charged in a single trial
would eliminate our present choice and conflict of law
problems.

This law would mark the end of jurisdictional

squabbles to determine which state's law should apply.

The

federal law would recognize the interstate nature of the
tort and would treat it as a single wrongful act for a
plaintiff to seek compensation from all applicable defend
ants .
Eradication of the Irrational and Anomolous Distinctions.
The categories between slander per se, slander per
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quod, libel per se, libel per quod, defamation from a pre
pared script, and ad-libed defamation would be discarded.
Certain words would no longer be actionable per se thereby
creating liability without proof of damages or negligence
or anything else.

Defamation from a script would no longer

be libelous per se, but would be subjected to the same
standards of proof as extemporaneous defamation.

Thus,

the distinctions which grew out of the sixteenth century
would be discarded with regard to radio and television.
In their place, the plaintiff would be required to prove
that certain imputations were of a defamatory nature and
that the defendant either had a malicious or wrongful
intent, or was negligent in either a direct or presumed
manner.
Equalization of Interests
The proposed changes would provide several new options
for both the plaintiff and the defendant which would more
nearly balance the interests of each.

Strict liability,

as it is known under our present laws, places an undue
burden upon a defendant, publisher, or disseminator, to be
liable without proof of fault or actual damage.

The neg

ligence standard, without the option of a presumption under
the res ipsa loquitor doctrine, places an unreasonable
burden upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
breached a duty.

The interests are more clearly balanced

when a plaintiff is given a choice to prove actual malice
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or wrongful intent, negligence, or presumed negligence.
Although the plaintiff may not be able to prove negligence,
it may be presumed through application of the res ipsa
loquitor doctrine.
In addition, the plaintiff could also allege that the
defendant refused to retract an imputation or offer the
plaintiff a reply upon request.

The defendant could argue

that he offered the plaintiff a change to broadcast a re
traction or reply, or in fact did broadcast a retraction
or reply.

Thus, more variables designed to balance the

interests between these parties would be available for con
sideration by the courts.
Minimization of Mass Media Injuries to Personality
With the discontinuance of truth as a complete de
fense and absolute privilege, a broadcaster or disseminator
would no longer be permitted to broadcast truthful defama
tory imputations with a malicious and wrongful intent.

If

truthful defamatory imputations were published and dis
seminated, the motives and state of mind of the publisher
and disseminator must be sincere and forthright.

This

would afford a protection against unnecessary injuries to
personality.
The categorization of the manipulation of mass media
equipment as a qualified privilege serves the same purpose.
Although it might be argued that manipulation of equipment
should be subjected to a negligence standard of care,
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broadcasting equipment should at least be manipulated with
out malice or wrongful intent.
The issuance of a retraction in certain circumstances
may protect a person's reputation from significant harm.
Certainly it is better to immediately repair the plain
tiff's reputation, if possible, than to further burden that
reputation through litigation designed to offer compensation
for the defamatory imputation.
In the same manner, a timely and appropriate reply
by a defamed person may tend to repair a person's reputa
tion in the public's mind.

It cannot be denied that a de

famed person should have the right to speak the truth as
he sees it regarding his own reputation.
Allowance of Maximum Free Speech with Sufficient Individual
Protection
The rights of retraction and reply are found implied
in the first amendment's Constitutional guarantee of free
speech.

Any other interpretation would suggest that one

way communication without provisions for defense and reply
to allegations is our concept of free speech.

Certainly,

by free speech we do not mean freedom for the media powers
to castigate an individual in our society with not as much
as a "whimper" in terms of a retraction by the publisher
or disseminator of the imputation, or a reply by the tra
duced individual.

Our concept of free speech and fair play

is more equitable than that.

Our ideals are broad enough

to condone a free flow of information in a free society.
The extension of the New York Times' "malice stan
dard" to all matters of public concern is a furtherance
of this concept of free speech.

It is essential that the

media of radio and television broadcast "news" of a public
interest to the public without fear of litigation, pro
vided that these media do not entertain a malicious or
wrongful intent.
Protection from Unfair Manipulation of Media Equipment
Manipulation of camera lenses, color tones, vocal
intonations, and other equipment and techniques may in
certain cases defame an individual over radio or tele
vision.

That our present laws make no provision for this

type of defamation is unconscionable.

The manipulations

of mass media may cause millions of viewers to perceive
an individual in an unrealistic and defamatory sense.
Certainly, it is in the public interest, convenience, and
necessity to provide at least a minimal degree of pro
tection by limiting such manipulation to that conducted
with a rightful purpose and intent.
A Hypothetical Case
For the purpose of theoretically projecting applica
tions of proposed innovations in the lav;, the writer has
chosen to expand the hypothetical example of a defamatory
broadcast as recorded in the introduction of this research.
Let us assume that Mr. Joke Teller was an emcee of a
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nationally televised variety program which experienced a
decline in ratings.

The sponsors of the program insisted

that the program increase its ratings or face the pos
sibility of being dropped by the sponsors.

The program

directors instructed Joke Teller to enliven his program
in an effort to boost the program's ratings.

Following

these instructions, Joke Teller took it upon himself to
tell two humorous stories in a nationally televised broad
cast about Mr. Executive Citizen, who was a successful
President of Appropriate Savings and Loan Association.
Joke Teller alleged that "The President of the largest
savings and loan company in New York is a 'swinger'" noting
that the "swinging activities usually take place in the
Beautiful Islands and include many of the other executives
in Appropriate."

The emcee concluded with a final pun,

"If you desire to save and loan, go to Appropriate."

One

of the other guests on the show, Mr. Smart Guest, commented,
"If I had as much money as he owes, it wouldn't be appro
priate."

The following day a local radio station added to

the imputations by falsely reporting that "Appropriate
Savings and Loan Association has a financial deficit of over
two billion dollars."
Mr. Executive Citizen immediately contacted both the
national television network and the local radio station
demanding either a retraction or a right of reply.

The

national network denied both requests on the grounds that
the statements were reportedly true and that a retraction
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or reply would only further spread the imputation.

The

local radio station denied the request on the grounds that
its statements were true.

Mr. Executive Citizen took his

cases to a local magistrate who issued a court order to
the local radio station to offer Mr. Citizen a right of
reply, but denied the request of a national right of reply.
Mr. Citizen was granted a two minute reply following the
local station's main newscast whereupon he stated that
"the statements concerning a broadcasted report of a
financial deficit in Appropriate Savings and Loan were
false.

He further proceeded to explain and reveal the

exact financial condition of Appropriate thereby "setting
the record strait" as he called it.
Mr. Citizen, however, was not satisfied and proceeded
to file separate actions against the national television
network and the local radio station.

A magistrate de

termined that both broadcasts were of a defamatory nature
and could not find a clear privilege or defense for either
defendant.

The matter was, therefore, sent to a jury.

In the course of the trial against the national net
work, the plaintiff argued (1) that the imputations con
cerning himself were not true, and even if they were, the
defendant showed malice in not allowing a retraction or
reply;

(2) that a retraction or reply would have cleared

the plaintiff's reputation in many parts of the country
where his reputation was damaged; and (3) that the defend-
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and was negligent under the res ipsa loquitor doctrine
for if it had not been for the negligence of someone in
the network the statements would have been deleted during
the "live" broadcast.
The defendant national network countered with argu
ments that (1) the imputations were true, thereby pro
viding a qualified privilege which would require proof of
malice and the defendant network was completely unaware
that Mr. Teller was going to make defamatory imputations;
(2) a retraction or reply would have enhanced rather than
diminished the defamation if broadcasted nationally; and
(3) the defendant network was in no way negligent in
carrying out its duty to protect the interest of the plain
tiff, as the variety show was extemporaneous and out of
the defendant's control.
The plaintiff asked for general damages of $500,000;
special damages of $300,000; and exemplary damages of
$300,000.

Mr. Executive Citizen and the national network

then proceeded to rest their cases with the jury.
In the same trial, the plaintiff brough a second
action against Mr. Joke Teller, publisher of the alleged
defamacast.

Mr. Teller's only strong defense was that the

defamatory statements were true.

The plaintiff asked for

$200,000 in general damages, $300,000 in special damages,
and $300,000 in exemplary damages.

After arguments had

been heard from both sides, Mr. Citizen and Mr. Teller
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rested their cases with the jury.
The jury pronounced its verdict concerning both cases.
The jury held in regard to the case against the national
network that (1) the imputations concerning the plaintiff
were true with the exception of Mr. Smart Guest's comment
that "If I had as much money as he owes, it wouldn't be
appropriate" which, although defamatory, was extemporaneous
and Mr. Guest was not a defendant in this case;

(2) the

national network could not be liable under the res ipsa
loquitor doctrine for the false statement by Mr. Smart
because such a statement might normally slip by the censors
because of its quick and short duration and difficulty to
detect, although the defendant network was in exclusive
control; and (3) the defendant's refusal to broadcast a
retraction or reply did not constitute malice as a retraction
or reply might only have further spread the imputation.
The jury however found that the defendant, Mr. Joke Teller,
displayed a "malicious and wrongful intent" in broadcasting
his truthful defamatory imputations concerning the plaintiff
and awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in exemplary damages.
In the second trial the plaintiff, Appropriate Savings
and Loan Association, brought an action against the defend
ant, local radio station, for its follow-up news story
with an enlargement of the facts which turned out to be
untrue.

The plaintiff alleged that (1) the defendant radio

station was negligent in not more closely verifying the
authenticity of its news;

(2) even if the defendant were
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afforded a qualified privilege, he would be liable for
malice in refusing to retract or offer a reply upon re
quest by the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff's reply did
not erase the imputation, but only stopped it from be
coming even more serious.

The defendant offered as de

fenses (1) that a reasonable effort had been made to
verify the accuracy of the news story;

(2) that the station

was afforded a qualified privilege to report a matter of
public concern regarding the plaintiff and that the
defendant exhibited no malice or wrongful intent; and
(3) that the plaintiff's reply over the defendant's fa
cilities eliminated any harm which could have been done.
The plaintiff asked for $300,000 in general damages,
$300,000 in special damages, and $300,000 in exemplary
damages.
After extensive deliberation, the jury held (1) that
the defendant was afforded a qualified privilege to report
matters of public concern, as the financial status of
Appropriate Savings and Loan Association was a fair comment
regarding a matter of public interest; and therefore, the
defendant should not be held liable for negligence;

(2)

that the defendant should be held liable because of the
malice and wrongful intent displayed by refusing to retract
or offer a reply upon request by the plaintiff and not
until forced to do so by a court order; and (3) that the
plaintiff's reply over the defendant's station should go
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toward mitigation of damages to the extent of $250,000,
but that the defendant should be ass essed $50,000 in
exemplary damages.
Thus, the writer has attempted to construct a hypothetical case as it might logically proceed from the time
of broadcast to the time of trial,

Although not all of

the applicable principles of law pro posed in the model
statute are used in this example, th e flavor of options
and fairness with the ultimate deter:minations to be made
by a local magistrate and a jury are significant.

Under

the old law, a cause of action may have been cut off
through application of a legal categ ory and in other cases
may have been unjustly awarded.

Und er the new lav/, oppor-

tunities for litigation based upon
legal practice would prevail.

ommon sense and sound

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
With the advent of the printing press, Henry the VII
established the crime of libel to suppress the publica
tion of seditious materials.

Since slander had previously

been recognized by the law, the distinctions between
slander and libel developed.

Slander was considered to

be oral defamation; while libel was defined as written
defamation.
The introduction of the media of radio and television
caused the slander-libel distinctions to expand, adding
new categories and classifications.

Courts recognized

differences between slander per se, and slander per quod,
libel per se, and libel per quod; defamation from a script
and extemporaneous defamation; words which are actionable
per se and words which require proof of special damage;
defamation over radio and defamation over television.

How

ever, these distinctions and categories as applied to
defamation by broadcast proved anomalous and unacceptable.
As a result, in 1962 a Georgia court in American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson recognized
the distinct characteristics of defamation by broadcast
and created a new tort which it termed defamacast.
79

Defama-
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cast, which simply means defamation by broadcast, has not
been accepted as a new tort in more than a few juris
dictions; however, the need for a separate tort for defama
tion by broadcast has been recognized by a number of legal
theorists.
In fact, present laws of broadcast defamation have
generated several problems constituting reasons for
concern:

(1) The laws vary from state to state resulting

in conflict of laws.

(2) The slander-libel distinctions

as applied to radio and television result in grave in
equities and impractical adaptations.

(3) Arbitrary lines

drawn between actionable and non-actionable words destroy
the balance between free speech and the rights of a defamed
individual.

(4) Present standards of liability for broad

cast defamation are unacceptable.

(5) Media injuries to

personality are placed in a low level category of consider
ation.

(6)

The law neglects consideration of potentially

harmful aspects of radio and televised communications.
With justifiable reasons for concern, the writer ex
tracted applicable legal principles for the construction
of a new law, and considered the implications of the
theoretical dimensions of defamacast as a new tort.

Defama-

cast was considered, not merely as a barbarous new term,
but as a new tort with recognizable dimensions and related
lower level concepts.

This was accomplished in the form

of a model federal law of broadcast defamation.
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The extraction and explication of applicable legal
principles provided a basis for construction of the pro
posed statute.

The Uniform Single Publications Act which

six states have adopted was incorporated to minimize con
flict of law problems.

The res ipsa loquitor doctrine

which has been a workable part of tort law was applied
to balance interests between plaintiffs and defendants.
General, special, and exemplary damages were retained in
the law to provide alternative methods of compensation.
The right of retraction, which ten states have recognized
in their statutes; and the right of reply, which European
and South American countries have provided in their press
(newspaper) legislation, were written into the law to
encourage free speech.

Finally, absolute and qualified

privileges were modified in the proposed statute to
achieve equitable results.
Thus, the goal of this research was to construct a
federal law which would eliminate conflict of law prob
lems, irrational distinctions, favoritism toward a plain
tiff or a defendant, media injuries to personality, and
unfair manipulations of media equipment.

The effectiveness

of the proposed law in meeting these criteria may never be
tested; however, the efforts to adapt our laws to the media
of radio and television will inevitably transpire.
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